We analyse the relative welfare e¤ects of an R&D and an output subsidy in a mixed duopoly. We show that an R&D subsidy is bene…cial for society as a whole, and socially superior to an output subsidy, when spillovers are su¢ ciently high. Otherwise, an output subsidy is socially superior.
Introduction
Public …rms are present in several industries such as banking and insurance, gasoline distribution, radio, television, automobile and steel, health-care and energy (Anderson et al., 1997) . As recognised by White (1996) , among others, in mixed markets -where public …rms coexist with private ones -there are two production-related ine¢ ciencies: the output level is sub-optimal, and the distribution of production costs across …rms is not e¢ cient. To address these two market failures, the use of output subsidies has been proposed, and the so-called "irrelevance result" has been generated (White, 1996; Pal and White, 1998; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001 ). This is an important …nding suggesting that privatisation does not alter welfare, as long as the regulator can subsidise output. 1 Particular appreciation is expressed to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. We would also like to thank Frederic Tournemaine and Jinli Zeng for their helpful suggestions. Full responsibility for all shortcomings is ours. 2 In that context, the authors suggest that "an R&D subsidy may partly serve the same purpose as an output subsidy" (p. 235), since an R&D subsidy can tackle ine¢ ciencies related to output in addition to the ones regarding R&D. This is an interesting …nding but it also raises the question of whether the two subsidy schemes imply the same (or similar) welfare e¤ects.
In this paper, we show that an R&D subsidy is socially superior to an output subsidy only in speci…c circumstances: when technological spillovers are su¢ ciently high. The reason for this …nding is as follows. When spillovers are high, the gains from an R&D subsidy are relatively large. This is because each …rm receives a bene…cial cost spillover from its rival. Thus, the cost savings under an R&D subsidy, which are substantial, can compensate for the wasteful cost asymmetry associated with the public …rm's higher output relative to the private …rm. If, however, spillovers are low, then an output subsidy is socially superior to an R&D subsidy. This result indicates that there may be a welfare-related reason to favour one subsidy scheme over the other.
Model
Our model follows Gil-Moltó et al. Consider a simple market setting consisting of a public and a private …rm denoted by the subscripts 0 and 1, respectively. We assume that …rms face identical costs functions and marginal costs are increasing. 3 Moreover, …rms invest in R&D to look for process innovations. As well as its own R&D, a …rm can bene…t from its competitor's R&D via spillovers of intensity , with
where X i x i + x j is …rm i's 'e¤ective' R&D level, which represents the total reduction in …rm i's marginal cost due to R&D. The cost of investment is quadratic, re ‡ecting diminishing returns to R&D expenditure:
For simplicity, we normalise to 1; which ensures nonnegativity of all equilibrium variables. 4 If s x is the R&D subsidy rate, then each …rm receives S x (x i ) = s x x i ; 5 while S q (q i ) = si , if s q is the output subsidy rate. Assume that the inverse demand function is p = a Q, where p is price and Q is total output. Each …rm's pro…t is
The private …rm maximises pro…t, while the public …rm maximises social welfare de…ned as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) net of subsidies (S)
Note that subsidies cancel out when aggregating. The timing in the model is as follows. In stage one, the regulator commits to the level of an R&D or output subsidy so as to maximise welfare. In stage two, …rms choose simultaneously their R&D investments. In stage three, …rms compete in the product market by setting quantities. The game is solved by backward induction to obtain its subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Result
To understand the social optimality of each form of subsidy, we need to consider the increase in social welfare brought about by each subsidy. The change in social welfare can be split into three components:
To …x ideas, consider …rst the change in CS due to an R&D subsidy. This is given by
where CSj s=sx denotes CS under the (optimal) R&D subsidy; and CSj s=0 denotes CS when no subsidy is provided. Using the subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions in Appendix, it is no surprise that CS x > 0: the use of an optimal R&D subsidy increases CS. Similarly, we observe that CS rises under an optimal output subsidy: i.e. CS q = CSj s=sq CSj s=0 > 0.
An R&D subsidy yields greater CS than an output subsidy if public …rm produces more output than the private …rm; also, even though the public …rm undertakes more R&D, it still operates at a higher marginal cost than the private …rm. Thus, the distribution of production costs across …rms is not e¢ cient. As noted by White (1996) , using an output subsidy, ceteris paribus, has the e¤ect of redistributing output from the highermarginal-cost public …rm to the lower-marginal-cost private …rm. The resulting increase in the private …rm's output works toward lowering total industry costs. The lower industry costs tend to increase total output, which ceteris paribus increases CS. Importantly, when is low, the total cost savings under an R&D subsidy are small relative to an output subsidy. This is because each …rm receives only a limited bene…cial cost spillover from its rival; therefore, the cost savings under an R&D subsidy which are small cannot o¤set the excess costs associated with asymmetric outputs. As rises, however, the level of total e¤ective R&D increases. The resulting (overall) cost savings under an R&D subsidy become relatively large: they can now o¤set the excess costs associated with asymmetric outputs. As a result, an R&D subsidy becomes better than an output subsidy in terms of CS when spillovers are su¢ ciently high, as condition (5) suggests. 6 We can conduct similar analysis for PS. Once again, we con…rm that PS rises both with an R&D and an output subsidy. In line with CS, we …nd that the increases in PS are more pronounced under an R&D subsidy, if spillovers are su¢ ciently high
where ps 0:87. This outcome can be explained by considering the two components of PS, the public and the private …rm's pro…t. Using the subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions in GilMoltó et al. (2011) and Appendix, it is fairly straightforward to show that the private …rm's pro…t is always higher under an output subsidy than under an R&D subsidy: i.e. 1 j s=sq > 1 j s=sx . Intuitively, the private …rm cares only about its own pro…t. Thus, an output subsidy which redistributes output from the public to the private …rm, implies that the private …rm enjoys an increase in its market share. The public …rm, on the contrary, maximises welfare rather than its own pro…t. This means that the public …rm internalises the positive e¤ect of the R&D subsidy both on private pro…t and consumer surplus. Therefore, the public …rm undertakes more R&D than its private counterpart, even though R&D is costly. 7 If spillovers are high, then an increase in R&D incentivised by an R&D subsidy, will generate a larger extent of overall cost reduction compared to an output subsidy. Indeed, the public …rm's pro…t will be higher under an R&D subsidy than under an output subsidy provided that spillovers are su¢ ciently high: i.e. 0 j s=sx > 0 j s=sq if > 0:7. Combining private and public pro…t, the total PS will then be relatively higher under an R&D subsidy, but only if spillovers are su¢ ciently high, as condition (6) suggests. 6 We have checked that CS increases 'faster'with an R&D subsidy than with an output subsidy, as long as is su¢ ciently high; that is, @ @ ( CSj s=sx CSj s=sq ) > 0 if > 0:33. Thus, having started with a lower level of CS under an R&D subsidy, CS eventually becomes higher under an R&D subsidy. 7 It is well known that, in a purely private market, higher spillovers have the e¤ect of reducing the amount of R&D undertaken by each …rm. This is because the pro…t from investing in R&D cannot be fully appropriated. However, in the mixed market, and in the absence of subsidies, the public …rm invests more as spillovers increase; while the private …rm invests less, except if spillovers are relatively high (i.e. except if > 0:88). Thus the private …rm tends to free-ride on the public …rm's R&D, unless spillovers are relatively high. As has already been mentioned by Gil-Moltó et al. (2011), an R&D subsidy can address this market failure by inducing the private …rm to invest more as increases. We have also con…rmed that the same result regarding the private …rm's R&D is true under an output subsidy for most spillover values (except if spillovers are close to zero).
Finally, considering the costs of subsidy provision, S, we assess the relative welfare e¤ects of the two subsidy schemes. We …nd that an R&D subsidy leads to greater SW than an output subsidy if
where sw 0:54. As expected, a threshold value for spillovers exists such that an R&D subsidy may (or may not) be socially superior to an output subsidy. Indeed, from the foregoing analysis we know that an R&D subsidy increases both CS and PS, but only if spillovers are su¢ ciently high; which is in line with condition (7). This is because higher spillovers generate higher cost savings from R&D which are su¢ ciently larger than the ones from an output subsidy to compensate for the wasteful cost asymmetry. Therefore, as long as spillovers are su¢ ciently high, an R&D subsidy will lead to a relatively larger increase in welfare, and thus, it will be socially superior to an output subsidy. Otherwise, an output subsidy will be socially superior.
The following Proposition summarises this position. The analysis to this point has assumed the existence of two …rms. It might be wondered whether our results extend to an oligopoly. In this variant, it is fairly straightforward to show that, if the number of private …rms increases, then the importance of an output subsidy relative to an R&D subsidy decreases. This is because a higher number of private …rms mean that the output asymmetry between the public and the private …rms will be smaller in the absence of subsidies. Therefore, the role of an output subsidy in redistributing output becomes less prominent. 8 Moreover, our analysis makes the assumption that the R&D cost parameter, , is equal to 1. Within a model that explicitly accounts for the e¢ ciency of R&D, intuition suggests that, the higher is, the more costly it will be to do R&D; thus, the smaller will be the cost savings associated with a given R&D subsidy relative to an output subsidy. Only when spillovers are high and R&D is cheap (i.e. is high and is low) -and so the potential welfare gains from an R&D subsidy are relatively large -would adopting an R&D subsidy be socially superior to an output subsidy. Otherwise, an output subsidy would be socially superior. 9 The intuition is analogous regarding output production technology. 10 That is, a lower level of e¢ ciency will reduce the positive welfare e¤ect of an output subsidy relative to an R&D subsidy, thus making an output subsidy relatively less attractive.
Appendix
The subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes without subsidies and with an R&D subsidy come from Gil-Moltó et al. (2011). The following Table presents the equilibrium outcomes under an output subsidy. 11 8 For example, the threshold values of spillover below which an output subsidy is socially superior to an R&D subsidy are approximately 0.54, 0.29, 0.20 and 0.14 as the number of private …rms becomes 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 9 The calculations supporting this claim are available from the authors on request. 1 0 A lower level of e¢ ciency in the production of output corresponds to a higher level of within the context of the cost function Ci(qi; xi; xj) = ( c xi xj)qi + q 2 i ; i 6 = j; i; j 2 f0; 1g. 1 1 We have checked that the second-order conditions of all maximisation problems are ful…lled. Though not reported here, these conditions are available from the authors on request.
